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Introduction 
This article attempts to locate the origin of Foucault’s work on 
biopolitics and biopower in his writings on medicine and medicalization.  
Though the concept of biopower is in Foucault’s published work most 
closely associated with his genealogy of the dispositif of sexuality,1 this 
essay will set aside the question of sexuality and examine more closely the 
archeology and genealogy of the medical setup to which Foucault dedicated 
a significant portion of his work throughout the 60’s and 70’s, in order to 
find therein the lineage of his thought on biopower and biopolitics.  As 
Guillaume le Blanc proposes, “the medicalization of human life is the major 
event in biopolitics,” for it reveals that “the history of man merges more and 
more with the history of life, such that vital phenomena are increasingly 
determinant in the understanding of human life.”2  Now, Foucault appears, 
in the first volume of his History of Sexuality, to relegate, at least on the 
surface, this medicalization of life to a secondary position in relation to the 
setup of sexuality, a setup he believes to be central to the emergence during 
the 18th century of a power he will call in the final chapter of that work 
“biopower.”3  And yet this article will attempt to show that if one desires to 
find the trace of this novel form of power in Foucault’s work prior to March 
17th, 1976, the date when, during a lecture at the Collège de France, he 
introduced for the first time the concept of biopower,4 one should look 
precisely to Foucault’s work on medicine.  In particular, we will look in this 
essay at the 1963 edition and 1972 re-edition of Birth of the Clinic, as well as a 
series of lectures on medical power Foucault gave in Brazil in 1974, all of 
which set the stage, whether directly or indirectly, for the work on biopower 
that was to follow. 
 As we have already seen, it is in 1976, in the final chapter of the first 
volume of his History of Sexuality, that Foucault introduced for the first time 
in his published writings this novel object of analysis that he would come to 
call “biopower.”  Now, when one compares Foucault’s description of 
biopower in The Will to Knowledge to that of disciplinary power he had 
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provided the previous year in Discipline and Punish, one can immediately see 
that this new object of analysis is both more vast and more complex than the 
disciplinary power on which Foucault had heretofore concentrated, not only 
in his published writings, but also at the Collège de France, in the lectures he 
had given there throughout the early 1970’s.  Indeed, in “Right of Death and 
Power Over Life,” Foucault appears to complicate his own genealogy of 
power: where he had already demonstrated in Discipline and Punish that the 
West had, during the classical epoch, known a profound transformation in 
the regime of power operating within its societies, not only in its punitive 
systems, but throughout those societies, he shows in The Will to Knowledge 
that this transformation was not only that of a sovereign power into a 
disciplinary power, but that the classical epoch should also be seen as 
marking the emergence of an entirely novel regime of power, specifically, of 
a power “situated and exercised at the level of life, of the species, of the race, 
and of the large-scale phenomena of population.”5  Thus, according to 
Foucault, what is at stake in this novel modality of power is no longer the 
juridical existence of sovereignty, but the biological existence of a 
population: beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries, one can see the 
emergence of a regime of power whose mechanisms have as their function 
no longer solely that of exaction [prélèvement] (of time, goods, and so on), but 
also the incitation, reinforcement, control, monitoring, maximization, and 
organization of the forces upon which they intervene.  In other words, the 
regime of biopower that appears at this time is a power “that exerts itself 
positively on life, that endeavors to administer it, to increase it, to maximize 
it, to multiply it, to exercise over it precise controls and large-scale 
regulations.”6  From a regime of power in which the sovereign reserved for 
himself or herself the right to kill or to let live, we therefore transition to a 
regime of power that will put in play the biological imperative of “making 
live” [faire vivre], while reserving the right to “discard into death” [rejeter 
dans la mort] those who would threaten, by virtue of the biological danger 
they bear within them, the well-being and health of the population and, 
through it, the survival of the State. 
 Accordingly, the regime of power Foucault describes in “Right of 
Death and Power Over Life” is a power for which the point of intervention is 
no longer the juridical subject, nor even solely the somatic singularity 
discussed in Discipline and Punish, but a population of living beings, beings 
whose biological existence must henceforth be taken charge of and 
controlled through a number of setups, chief amongst which, for Foucault, 
appears to be that of sexuality.  Along with “biohistory,” understood as the 
pressures through which the processes of life and of history interfere with 
one another, we must consequently analyze the emergence of something like 
a “biopolitics,” understood in this context as that which introduces life and 
its mechanisms into the domain of “explicit calculations” and makes of 
power and knowledge “agents of transformation” of human life.7 
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 Now, concretely, and it is this affirmation on the part of Foucault that 
will serve as the starting point for our analysis, this biopolitics, this “power 
over life,” took two principal forms: 1) a technology/politics of the 
individual human body concerned with controlling and taming the forces of 
the body through the application of disciplinary mechanisms, and 2) a 
technology/politics of the population concerned with the regulation of 
processes proper to a mass of living beings, such as birth and mortality rates, 
lifespan, health and medical practices, and so on.8  Far from conflicting with, 
or even mutually excluding, one another, these two modalities intersect, 
constantly supporting and reinforcing each other.  Thus, if disciplinary 
power consists of those mechanisms and tactics whose operation produces a 
docile body and a normalized subject, then biopolitics concerns itself with 
addressing problems of mass and with regulating the life of a population: as 
Foucault would explain in his 1977 Security, Territory, Population lecture 
course, the failure of sovereign and disciplinary mechanisms of power to 
deal with increasingly destabilizing problems of mass (problem-events such 
as famines, epidemics, and the like, as well as problematic spaces like the 
city) necessitated the elaboration of a novel biopolitical setup, one that took 
the population, and its myriad phenomena, as its point of intervention.9  
Within this novel modality of power, the disciplines would continue to play 
a crucial role, insofar as biopower’s interventions upon the population 
resulted in a new understanding of the relation between the collective and 
the individuals that taken together composed the social body; in the context 
of the relevance of governmental action, many new measures of government 
were intended to have mass effects upon the population, such that the level 
of the multiplicity of individuals became more of a relay for these collective 
effects. 
 At the heart of Foucault’s work on biopower, then, lies the population, 
as well as the question of how novel mechanisms and technologies were 
elaborated in order to ensure its health and well-being.  As Foucault notes 
early in The Will to Knowledge, the 18th century saw the emergence of one of 
the great innovations of the nascent regime of biopower, namely, the 
constitution of the population as an “economic and political problem,” and 
consequently as an object of intervention.10  During that time, modern 
European states began to conceive of themselves as having to govern not 
only subjects, nor only a people, but entire populations, that is, populations 
as a form of wealth, populations as a resource, populations as possessing 
productive forces to be harnessed and put to use, and populations as 
multiplicities composed of living and dying organisms and exhibiting 
processes and phenomena proper to such a group, such as, for instance, 
birth and death rates, life expectancy, state of health, as well as behaviors 
bearing directly upon the population’s well-being.  Accordingly, the 
population, as well as its vital processes and phenomena, represented one of 
the points of intersection at which the “movements proper to life and the 
effects particular to institutions” met.11 Thus, states, for the first time, 
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affirmed that their future and destiny were inextricably tied not only to the 
number of citizens at their disposal, for instance, but to the manner in which 
individuals behaved with respect to their own health, behaviors that not 
only affected them, but had a direct effect on the massive phenomena of the 
population which they made up, such as its birth and mortality rates.12  For 
the first time, a population’s health became a matter of state concern and a 
domain of intervention for various discourses and mechanisms of power.  
As such, the question that arose within the regime of biopolitics was the 
following: how to intervene upon and regulate a series of phenomena 
(lifespan, mortality rates, birthrates, illness) that are proper to a population 
of living beings? 
 It is here, in response to this problem, that we encounter the question 
of the way in which the two modalities of power Foucault described in 
Discipline and Punish and The Will to Knowledge, namely, the disciplining of 
the individual and the biopolitical regulation of the health of a population, 
relate to one another and operate in conjunction with each other.  As le Blanc 
rightfully notes, the emerging regime of biopolitics did not do away with the 
disciplines; rather, “biopower brings the disciplinary to completion” by 
making use of the disciplines’ intervention upon the individual in order to 
exercise a regulatory control on the scale of the collective.13  Accordingly, we 
find at the heart of the question of how these two modalities of power relate 
to one another a triptych of interrelated setups, namely, the setups of 
sexuality, race, and medicalization, whereby each of them ensures, in ways 
that often implicate the others, the junction between disciplinary power and 
biopower.14 
 Now, if, in this essay, we choose to focus on the setup of 
medicalization, its role in the biopolitical regulation of the health of the 
population, and its origins in his work prior to 1976, it is not because 
sexuality and race are secondary within Foucault’s genealogy of biopower, 
but because medicalization, as Mauro Bertani notes, is the one setup through 
which a line of continuity can be established throughout the quasi-entirety 
of Foucault’s project.  Even if, in his published work, Foucault devoted only 
one text, Birth of the Clinic, to the explicit question of medicine, the problem 
of medical power and its role in the administration of life was nevertheless 
“determinant, not only for the life sciences in their entirety, but also for the 
history of the forms of truth and rationality, and ultimately for the historical-
political actuality itself.”15  To be more specific, it is a problem we encounter 
as early as 1961, in History of Madness, and as late as 1984, in the very last text 
Foucault would publish, i.e., “Life: Experience and Science,” his preface to 
the English translation of Canguilhem’s The Normal and the Pathological.  But 
in Foucault’s work, a number of texts prove to be crucial in terms of 
understanding how he would arrive at his formulation in 1976 of the 
problematic of biopower and its relation to the population.  The first of 
these, of course, is the aforementioned Birth of the Clinic, which Foucault 
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published for the first time in 1963, and which he revised for republication in 
1972, in the midst of his explicit turn, first announced in his inaugural 
lecture at the Collège de France, to a genealogy of the myriad mechanisms of 
power. 
 In biopower’s administration of life, the medicalization of the 
population and the elaboration during the 18th century of a politics of health 
would, along with the setups of sexuality and race, come to play central 
roles.  Indeed, of the problems of mass these novel mechanisms of power 
were intended to address, the most disruptive and dangerous to the well-
being of the social body was, along with the related problem of the city, the 
problem of mass illness.  We will therefore focus here on the phenomenon of 
illness and discuss that operation of biopower that in the 18th century 
resulted in the widespread medicalization of the population. Foucault 
would not explicitly introduce within his project the concept of biopower 
until much later, of course, but by that time, he had already done a 
significant amount of work on the question of the medicalization of the 
population.  Thus, we will begin by looking at his discussion of the medicine 
of epidemics in Birth of the Clinic,16 and subsequently turn to a series of 
lectures Foucault would in the early 1970’s devote entirely to an analysis of 
the process of medicalization that would ultimately prove essential to the 
operation of the modern regime of biopower. 
Birth of the Clinic: Toward a Social Medicine of Endemics 
To be sure, the emergence of a politics of health during the classical 
epoch did not occur as a response to the threat of illness alone; other factors, 
such as the inefficient and costly organization of society with regard to the 
practice of medicine, also contributed greatly to the widespread 
medicalization that took place during this time.  Nevertheless, the changing 
status of illness within a society increasingly concerned with the promotion 
and management of the health of an entire population contributed greatly to 
the birth of a novel form of social medicine. 
A. Liberating the Medical Space  
In Birth of the Clinic, Foucault describes the way in which one of the 
factors that contributed most to the transition from an individualized and 
classificatory “medicine of species” to a centralized medicine of epidemics 
and endemics had to do with the singular and ambiguous position of the 
hospital within the practice of medicine.  Concluding his description of the 
medicine of species that had dominated the practice of medicine in Europe 
into the 18th century, Foucault notes that the hospital had come to pose a 
problem within both the medical and economic ordering of society.  First, 
and at the level of medicine, rather than isolating an illness and thereby 
permitting it to appear to the doctor in its truth and essence, the hospital 
represented a space of mixture and contagion where illnesses intermingled, 
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a “disordered garden” where the various “species [of illness]” were allowed 
to intersect, thus altering their “proper nature” and masking their singular 
truth.17  And second, the hospital also represented for society an economic 
problem: once admitted, the patient, already unable to participate in the 
productive activity of society, now became a drain upon that society’s 
resources.  Faced with this problematic status of the hospital within the 
practice of medicine of the day, the dominant medicine of species and 
leading economic theorists engaged in a thorough critique and questioning 
of the utility of the hospital in the classification and treatment of illness, on 
the one hand, and in the economic ordering of society, on the other. 
 Now, at the heart of the efforts of reform undertaken during this time, 
and as a forerunner of the privileged function it would come to fulfill in 
biopower’s normalization of the social body, lay the institution of the family.  
As the “natural locus of life,” the family was also the “natural locus of 
illness” and therefore that privileged space where the illness could “deploy 
itself in its truth.”18  Indeed, where the hospital’s doctor could only ever see 
an illness in its mixed and modified state, the person treating a patient in the 
home could isolate the illness and thereby ascertain its true nature. 
 Brought to its logical conclusion, then, this desire for a reform of the 
practice of medicine focused on the space of the family—itself motivated by 
a desire to allow an illness to manifest itself in its truth and thereafter to 
place it within a complete pathological taxonomy—implied a “free 
spatialization” devoid of any “privileged region” such as that of the 
hospital, a free space where illness could be allowed to follow its natural 
course and deploy itself in its own “essence” and truth.  If medicine was to 
establish a knowledge and classification of illness, then illness had to be left 
in its “original ground [sol d’origine]”—the family—and allowed to reveal 
itself to the doctor.19  At the level of the practice of medicine, accordingly, 
such a plan had the benefit of allowing the reigning medicine of species to 
operate in the classificatory manner in which it was intended, while at the 
level of the economic problem of public assistance, the liberation of the space 
of illness in favor of the family and at the expense of the hospital would 
have the additional benefit of relieving society of its burden and place the 
onus of assistance upon the relatives of the afflicted.20 
 Consequently, and taken together, these two concerns with the 
structure of the hospital—raised first by the medicine of species, not by the 
medicine of epidemics that would follow—called for a novel way of 
conceiving of the role of medicine in society, as well as of the social space in 
which this medicine was to be practiced.  Thus, as Foucault remarks, the 
concerns of the classificatory doctors and those of the economists intersected 
and called for the reorganization of the space of illness into an “open space” 
in which illness was to be isolated and permitted to follow its course, a 
“homogeneous space” that would fall under the eye of a medical gaze 
concerned primarily with the classification of the species of illness within the 
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context of the practice of a private form of medicine applied to the patient 
not in his capacity as member of a population, but as a private individual.21 
 This attempt at the reform of the practice of medicine would not yet 
mark the emergence of the politics of health and social medicine that would 
accompany the thorough investment of the population on the part of 
biopower.  Moreover, the attempt to isolate the essence of an illness and to 
classify it within a rigid taxonomy by liberating and homogenizing the space 
in which it appears, rather than by further restricting it to a privileged, 
medicalized space such as the hospital, may seem paradoxical.  And yet, in 
its attempt to make the space of the practice of medicine an open and 
homogeneous one devoid of any privileged and isolated medicalized region, 
the medicine of species lay the foundation for what would soon take the 
form of the thorough and widespread medicalization of the social space as a 
whole.  By the same token, and by taking its efforts to their logical, though 
contradictory, extreme, it would also lay the foundation for its own 
disappearance.  That is, devoid of any privileged medical space, the entirety 
of the social space could be opened up to an investment and to 
medicalization.  That is not to say, of course, that the hospital disappeared 
entirely.  But in the efforts to reduce its role and importance within the 
practice of medicine, an entirely novel conception of the social space 
emerged, a conception that lent itself to the medical investment of the social 
body, and ultimately to the operation of biopower at the level of the 
population.  And in this newly-medicalized, open and homogeneous space, 
the medicine of species would eventually vanish and give way to a medicine 
of epidemics, and with it to a novel concern for the health not of the private 
citizen, but of the population as a whole. 
B. The Epidemic Event 
Describing the extreme liberation of the medical space in which the 
logic of the medicine of species would ultimately undo itself, Foucault 
proposes that a “medical experience diluted in the free space” of a society 
organized according to the figure of the family implies, through the 
particular attention paid to the health of each individual, a “generalized 
vigilance” whose extension coincides with the “group as a whole.”  In other 
words, in order to do what it set out to do, the practice of medicine had to 
become a state medicine, that is, a “national task” ultimately connected to a 
centralized politics of health.  Thus, the familial model of medicine had to 
rely on a structure of medicine that was “collectively controlled” and that 
would exert an influence over the entirety of the social space, with the end of 
the 18th century thereby witnessing a definite “institutional spatialization of 
illness.”22  This institutionalization of illness would play an essential role in 
the medical investment of the population on the part of biopower. 
Moreover, it is a development in which the problem of epidemics would 
figure prominently. 
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 With the advent of the medicine of state, to the rise of which the 
efforts of the medicine of species ultimately contributed, we can already see 
a transition from the health of the individual to that of the collective: insofar 
as the “liberation” of the medical space implied a generalized vigilance over 
the entirety of the social space, it was only natural that the “political 
consciousness” of illness become concerned with the health of the social 
body as a whole.  Later, Foucault would explicitly conceive of this transition 
in terms of biopower and population.  In Birth of the Clinic, he would address 
this transition in its relation to a changing perception of illness, and of the 
threat of illness, within the practice of medicine. 
 Even as, during the end of the 18th century, the medicine of species 
was following its own logic of liberation to its conclusion, the concepts of 
epidemic, of endemic illness, and so on, were following their own 
conceptual path.  Each of these two medical concerns—that having to do 
with classificatory medicine’s opening up of the social space as a medical 
space and that having to do with the increasing importance of the problem 
of epidemics—would eventually intersect within a centralized social 
medicine that would come to invest the social body through and through.  
But at first, the problem of epidemics remained separate from that of the 
structure of the hospital, for instance, or of the status of public assistance.  
As Foucault himself would state in Birth of the Clinic, the notions of 
“endemic illness” and “epidemic” would, during the classical epoch and 
with respect to the medicine of species, have a “singular destiny [destinée 
singulière].”23  And at the heart of this singular destiny would lie the 
complex, but increasingly important, relation between the concepts of 
“constitution,” of “epidemic,” and of “endemic illness.” 
 Appearing around the end of the 17th century in the work of figures 
like Thomas Sydenham and gaining subsequent prominence, the concept of 
the epidemic “constitution” would, according to Foucault, mark the advent 
of a novel “historical and geographical consciousness of illness.”24  
Emerging as a new manner of conceiving of illness, the epidemic 
constitution referred not to an “autonomous,” pure species of illness, but to 
a “transitory knot” of causal factors, that is, of natural phenomena tied to the 
appearance of such and such illness.  In this way, factors that had hitherto 
been neglected in the consideration of mass illness—factors such as climate, 
quality of soil, famine, and so on—would become central to the emerging 
medicine of epidemics, and would set the stage for the emergence of a 
medicine of the collective. 
 In the pages of Birth of the Clinic dedicated to the problem of the 
epidemic and to its relation to the birth of a state medicine, Foucault shows 
the manner in which the concept of the epidemic constitution provided a 
new framework through which could be conceptualized illness in general 
and epidemics in particular.  As the concept began to take hold over the 
course of the 18th century, so too did a new conception of illness as a 
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massive, rather than individual, phenomenon. That is to say, even as the 
concept of illness as species remained a legitimate medical concern for the 
time, the epidemic became a “coherent and sufficient mode” of conceiving of 
illness, rather than the mere “particular form” of a species of illness.  The 
epidemic, for the emerging medicine of the collective, represented a 
constitution whose phenomena proved more constant and homogeneous 
than usual.  For this reason, the proper object of a medicine of epidemics 
was not a “specific type” of illness, but rather a “knot” of circumstances, 
conditions, and causal factors: the ground of an epidemic was not a 
particular illness, such as the bubonic plague, but the group of 
environmental causes and events responsible for the appearance of a given 
illness at a given time and in a given place, such as the conditions in 
Marseille in 1721, in Rouen in 1769, and so on.25 
 The question, then, was not one of classification, as it had been for the 
medicine of species, but one of causality.  Thus, the task of the medicine of 
mass illness was not to identify the “general form of an illness” and then to 
classify it within an ordered taxonomy, but instead to ascertain beneath the 
“general signs of illness” the “variable” and “singular process” linking the 
causal knot of a massive illness to its manifest, “morbid form.”  If the 
constancy of the signs of an illness across a group of people indicated 
anything, it was not a “natural order,” but a “constancy of causes” to be 
analyzed.  And this analysis, in turn, could take two general forms.  In some 
cases, the causes to be analyzed could be the type of causes linked to a 
morbid form of illness that seemingly appeared at random, in one place, and 
afflicted all people, regardless of age, sex, and so on, only to disappear as 
abruptly as it had appeared.  As understood within the nascent medicine of 
massive illnesses, these morbid forms of illness were tied to a general, but 
accidental, that is, aleatory, causal knot and were what should properly be 
termed “epidemics.”  In other cases, meanwhile, the causes to be analyzed 
could be of the sort to last over time, manifesting themselves at specific 
times and in specific places, but never really disappearing, unlike the causes 
linked to epidemics.  Though related to the latter, the types of morbid forms 
tied to these more lasting, constant causal knots nonetheless differed from 
them and were properly called “endemic illnesses.”26  Now, in later texts 
like “Society Must Be Defended,” Foucault would claim that even if the 
biopolitics of the population that accompanied the emergence of biopower 
came to be concerned with both types of massive illness, the endemic illness, 
by virtue of the constancy of the threat it posed to the population, came to 
occupy a privileged position within the politics of health of the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  Setting aside this distinction for the moment, however, we can see 
how both the problems of epidemic and endemic illnesses would become 
essential to an effort aimed at the protection of the population through its 
thorough medicalization. 
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 To be sure, Foucault does not, at least in Birth of the Clinic, explicitly tie 
the problem of massive illness to biopower.  But his discussion of the 
nascent medicine of epidemics and endemics does provide us with some 
indication of the manner in which the two—the problem of massive illness 
on the one hand and biopower’s medicalized administration of life—came to 
be connected within a nascent politics of health.  Distinguishing massive 
illnesses from individual, classifiable species, Foucault explicitly 
characterizes endemic and epidemic illnesses in terms of the concept of an 
“event:” central to an epidemic constitution, and thus under any 
phenomenon of mass illness, is a knot of causal factors and conditions 
conceived of as “natural events,” and which must be analyzed in relation to 
the morbid forms to which they give rise in a given space and at a given 
time.27  Moreover, within the domain of life, classical medicine conceived of 
an epidemic or endemic event as a singular, aleatory rupture, a certain play 
of forces taking morbid form within a series of natural conditions, such as 
climate, sanitary conditions, diet, and so on.  And as we have already 
discussed, the task of a medicine of epidemics became that of identifying 
that “singular process” linking the causal knot of the constitution to the 
morbid form, a form that was held to be common to all who were afflicted, 
but singular in a particular place and at a particular time.28  The epidemic, 
then, was a complex, seemingly contradictory, event: as a “collective 
phenomenon” that has at its heart a “unique process,” it called for a method 
of analysis and intervention suited to its peculiarities. The epidemic 
therefore required a new medical approach, one that would come to have 
far-reaching effects within the operation of what Foucault would later call 
the biopolitics of the population. 
 Constantly balancing the peculiar structure of a singular, yet 
collective, event, the emerging medicine of epidemics had to concern itself 
with two, seemingly contradictory, imperatives: to account for the 
singularity of the epidemic event while bringing to bear upon it a “multiple 
gaze” capable of accounting for the repetition of the event across an entire 
group of people.29  Accordingly, where the medicine of species had sought 
to establish a comprehensive pathological taxonomy within which could it 
could place a symptom, an illness, and so on, the analysis of constitutions 
and epidemics sought to “establish a network [réseau]” through the “play of 
series” that, by virtue of their intersection, enabled the reconstitution of the 
chain linking an epidemic constitution to its singular morbid form.30  The 
real work of the medicine of epidemics, that is, took place in that point of 
“systematic” intersection between various “series of information” that were 
“homogeneous” with respect to themselves but “different from one 
another,” various series—such as observations concerning climate, quality of 
soil, &c—that encompassed an “infinite grouping of separate [read, 
dispersed] events” whose aleatory combination allowed for the irruption of 
the “individual fact” of the morbid form.31 
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 Here, then, the event of mass illness represents an “emergence within 
the fundamental structures,” a novel figure in the practice of medicine as it 
conceived of itself during the classical epoch.32  And in response to this new 
figure of the epidemic event, an entirely new social model for the practice of 
medicine at the level of the collective would emerge.  At the practical level, 
the response to these aleatory, singular events that ceaselessly threatened the 
health of entire groups of people took many different forms, all of which 
find their significance within the intervention of biopower at the level of the 
population and in the biopolitical effort to control and administer 
dangerous, aleatory events in the name of the protection of the social body. 
C. The Birth of State Medicine 
As a phenomenon different from that of an individual illness, an 
epidemic or endemic event called for new methods of intervention, methods 
that would emerge within the context of the definition of “a political status 
for medicine” and the constitution of “a medical consciousness” that, at the 
level of the state, would be charged with the “constant task” of 
“information, control, and constraint.”  In other words, here, in these 
passages of Birth of the Clinic, Foucault provides us with an early account of 
the emergence of what he would a decade later call a “politics of health” and 
a “social medicine,” and which he would connect to the intervention of 
biopower upon the population.  As he would show, the response to the 
phenomenon of mass illness, which posed a constant threat to the health of 
the social body, would eventually result in the widespread medicalization of 
society. 
 As Foucault explains, the nature of epidemic and endemic illnesses 
was such that a medical response to the threat they posed had, at least in 
part, to take the form of a “constant and constraining intervention,” which is 
to say that there could be no effective medicine of epidemics that was not 
supported by a “police,” in the sense of an authoritative body charged with 
the administration of the practice of medicine and the control of other 
aspects of life bearing directly upon the health of the social body, such as the 
location of mines and cemeteries, the incineration of cadavers, the regulation 
of slaughterhouses and tanneries, the eradication of conditions of life 
conducive to the irruption of epidemic events, and so on.  In addition, this 
novel practice of medicine on a collective scale called for the elaboration of a 
new set of “health regulations,” as well as the creation of a “corpus of 
health” tasked with observation and the collection of information and data 
to be disseminated throughout the social space.  In this way, the medicine of 
epidemics represented a completely novel manner of practicing medicine 
and of conceiving of the status of illness in relation to society, entailing the 
“collective perception” of, and intervention upon, a massive, though 
singular, event.33  What appeared around this time, then, at the expense of 
an individuating medicine of species, was a practice of social medicine 
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intended to fulfill a function of “totalization,” with respect to both the 
diagnosis of the epidemic event and to its own proper point of intervention, 
which would now be the entirety of the social space.  Beginning in the 18th 
century, that which characterized the unity of the practice of medicine was 
this “open, infinite totalization,” which had as its ultimate task the “clinical 
recording of a variable and infinite series of events” so that the control and 
management of these variable, aleatory events could then be assured in the 
name of the health of the population.34 
 In this task, the medicine of epidemics was to rely, as we have seen, 
upon a collective medical consciousness of all the observations made and 
data collected within a medicalized space now opened and enlarged to the 
dimensions of “a history, of a geography, of a state.”35  This required, first 
and foremost, that the practice of medicine become centralized and 
subsequently effect the medicalization of the open social space as a whole.  
In other words, and in a process that we will examine in greater detail in the 
next part of this essay, the medical space had to be made to “coincide” with 
the social space or, rather, to “penetrate it completely,” in a process that 
would take a variety of forms to be discussed later.36 
 Broadly, however, and in a formulation that would a decade later 
become typical of Foucault’s account of biopower, we can say that this 
medicalization of the social space would both require and be effected 
through, first, the “generalized presence” of medical institutions and 
authorities, a presence that would lay the foundation for a “constant, mobile, 
and differentiated surveillance” at all times and in all corners of the social 
space.37  Thus, the classical epoch, in response to the danger posed by the 
epidemic event, came to witness the emergence of a novel social medicine 
that would, in its every action, greatly facilitate the extension of mechanisms 
and institutions of power over the entirety of the social space and social 
body, and do so in the name of their well-being. 
 Consequently, the locus of medical practice and knowledge ceased to 
be the pathological taxonomy of the species of illnesses and instead became 
a constant and “generalized medical consciousness” disseminated 
throughout the social space and “tied to each individual existence, but also 
to the collective life of the nation, always alert as to the indefinite domain 
where the danger [le mal] belies, under its diverse aspects, its great massive 
form.”38  With the emergence of a novel politics of health, the practice of 
medicine became inextricably tied to the “destinies of states,” and was 
charged, along with other mechanisms of power, with instituting “in the life 
of men the figures of health, of virtue, and of happiness.”39  This was 
achieved, at the level of the collective and in the context of the threat of the 
epidemic illness, through the constitution of a totalized, medicalized open 
space—a “homogeneous configuration”—in which an “exhaustive” and 
“permanent” knowledge of the “health of a population” could be 
established.40  During the 18th century, the demands of a “political ideology” 
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and those of a “medical technology” intersected, giving birth to a politics of 
health that would come to play an essential role in the biopolitics of the 
population elaborated within a regime of biopower in order to ensure the 
health and stability of the population.  Exactly what form this politics of 
health took, as well as the exact nature of its relation to the population, will 
be the subject of the next section of this essay. 
The Medicalization of the Population 
As Guillaume le Blanc explains in La pensée Foucault,41 the new 
phenomenon of the study of mass endemic illnesses, of their length and 
causes, of morbidity, &c, no longer solely at the individual level but also on 
the scale of the collective, resulted, as Foucault would observe in “Society 
Must Be Defended,” in “the development of a medicine whose main 
function [would] now be that of public hygiene, with institutions to 
coordinate medical care, centralize power, and normalize knowledge.”42  In 
other words, the classical epoch saw the widespread medicalization of the 
population, of the social space, as well as of the family and sexuality; at that 
time, the medicalization of the population was one of the chief measures in 
the biopolitics of a state for which the life (i.e., the biological health and well-
being) of its population had become a major concern, and had therefore 
emerged as a point of application for various mechanisms of medical power.  
As we have just seen, moreover, even if Foucault waited until The Will to 
Knowledge to connect the increasing role of medical power in the lives of 
individuals and populations to his genealogy of biopower, it is a subject he 
had already explored in depth in Birth of the Clinic.  And as we will now 
discuss, it is a topic he would revisit in a series of texts and lectures that set 
the stage for the work on power that was to come. 
 In a series of talks given in Brazil in 1974, Foucault returned to the 
question of the medicalization of the population and provided a deeper 
analysis of the emergence of a centralized politics of health during the 
classical epoch.  Two lectures, in particular, contain the seeds of Foucault’s 
later thought on biopolitics and biopower, and can therefore help us to 
understand better the crucial relation in Foucault’s thought between 
biopower, population, and medicalization: the first lecture, entitled “Crisis 
of Medicine or Crisis of Anti-Medicine?” and never translated into English, 
addresses the question of the relation between the state and medicine, while 
setting the stage for the second lecture, “The Birth of Social Medicine,” in 
which Foucault provides an analysis of the setup of medicalization that 
would become central to his later genealogy of biopower.43  In these 
important lectures, Foucault returns to the questions that had motivated part 
of his inquiry in Birth of the Clinic, but which he had not developed in greater 
depth.  And in the process of returning to these questions, Foucault 
introduces for the first time the concepts of biohistory and biopolitics that 
would eventually become so prevalent in his later project.  In Birth of the 
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Clinic, Foucault had identified the problem of epidemics and endemic illness 
as one of the factors that had most contributed to the emergence of a novel 
form of medicine aimed at the homogenization of the social space and at the 
widespread medicalization of the population in the name of the health of the 
social body.  Developing these themes further, Foucault would provide in 
“Crisis of Medicine or of Anti-Medicine?” and “The Birth of Social 
Medicine” a genealogy of this process of medicalization of the population, as 
well as a clearer basis on which to understand one of the most significant 
ways in which biopower came to exercise itself at the collective scale of the 
population. 
 Foucault proposes in “Crisis of Medicine or Crisis of Anti-Medicine 
that “we live under a regime for which one of the points of state intervention 
is the care of the body, the health of the body, the relation between sickness 
and health, etc.”44  To be more specific, the 18th century, as he had already 
discussed in Birth of the Clinic, saw not only a “vertiginous technological 
progress,” but also a “political, economic, social, and juridical 
transformation of medicine,”45 a transformation whereby it is no longer the 
individual, or the individual illness, that is the focus of medical intervention, 
but a different object entirely; within modern medicine, he argues, “it is the 
entirety of the phenomenon of life that is (…) inserted into the field of action 
of medical intervention.”46  In this analysis, certain elements echo much of 
Foucault’s earlier work on medicine, while at the same time offering a 
glimpse of the genealogy of biopower that was to come in History of 
Sexuality, as well as his Collège de France lectures.  Thus, Foucault notes, there 
appeared with this novel form of medical intervention a “new dimension of 
medical possibilities,” which he calls “bio-history,” in which medicine came 
to intervene upon the level of “life itself” and of its fundamental 
phenomena: “life and the history of man,” in other words, are profoundly 
connected, such that human (that is, political) action can intervene upon the 
domain of life itself.47 
 Now, it is this intervention with which Foucault is concerned in these 
lectures, for it took the privileged form of what he calls an “indefinite 
medicalization”: beginning in the classical epoch, medicine started to 
function “outside of its traditional field,” as delineated by the patient’s 
needs, the patient’s pain, his or her symptoms, and so forth, and began to 
take on a social function it had not hitherto fulfilled.  Anticipating the role 
that the concept of biopower would come to occupy within his genealogy, 
Foucault points out here that within this indefinite medicalization, medicine 
began to respond less to the needs of an individual patient and, rather, 
started “[imposing] itself upon the individual, whether sick or not, as an act 
of authority.”48  Moreover, the transformation of medicine of which Foucault 
provides a genealogy also saw a change in terms of the very object of 
medical transformation, from physical illness to objects like sexuality and 
health, both of which, it should be noted, would come to occupy crucial 
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roles in ensuring the junction between biopower’s disciplinary intervention 
upon the individual and its regulatory intervention upon the health of the 
population: as he proposes in this 1974 lecture on medicalization, “the 
authoritarian intervention of medicine in a domain of individual and 
collective existence that is each time more vast” is one of this new regime’s 
most characteristic facts.49 
 Accordingly, this analysis of the indefinite medicalization of society, 
which he would describe in greater detail in his second lecture, leads 
Foucault to propose that today, “medicine possesses an authoritarian 
power,” one with a normalizing function that reaches far beyond illness and 
the demands of a given patient.50  Now, what Foucault is describing here in 
terms of a biohistory is of course the very same process he would, in his 
work on biopower, connect to the birth during the 18th century of a 
biopolitics of health, whereby the domain of life itself emerged as a 
privileged object of state (in this case, medical) intervention.  In this way, we 
can already see that his early work on medicalization would already 
anticipate much of his later analysis of biopower. 
 This is particularly evident in his analysis of the four processes that 
characterized the emergence of this novel medical power, namely, 1) the 
emergence of a medical authority whose decisions affect not only 
individuals, but entire villages, towns, and cities (that is, populations); 2) the 
emergence of an object of medical intervention distinct from illness (the air a 
population breathes, the water it drinks, its conditions of existence); 3) the 
introduction, in the form of the modern hospital, of an “apparatus of 
collective medicalization”; as well as, finally, 4) the creation of a centralized 
medical administration of the social body.  Take together, these processes 
helped to establish a modern medicine that lacks any domain exterior to it.51  
Thus, and in a statement that reveals just how central to his work this setup 
of medicalization had been and would continue to be, Foucault would 
conclude this first lecture with the following claim: within this indefinite 
medicalization of the population and the social space,  
the preponderance given to pathology becomes a general 
form of the regulation of society.  Today, medicine no 
longer has a field external to it.  (…)  One could affirm 
about the modern society in which we find ourselves that 
we live in ‘open medical States’ in which medicalization is 
without limits.52 
As Foucault would later explain, this indefinite medicalization of society 
represents one of the most crucial developments in a regime of power whose 
chief concern became that of ensuring the well-being and health of entire 
populations.  As problems like endemic and epidemic illnesses, as well as 
the space of the city, began to threaten not only individuals, but populations 
and, through them, the stability of the state, novel techniques and 
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mechanisms were called upon to intervene both at the level of the individual 
and at the scale of the collective.  Here, medicalization remains a privileged 
setup.  And having merely broached the topic of medicalization in his first 
lecture, Foucault would devote his second lecture to the analysis of the 
emergence during the 18th century of a social medicine tasked with 
intervening upon the social body as a whole. 
 Endeavoring to trace the development of the medical system since the 
18th century and to analyze the model guiding modern medical and hygienic 
practices, Foucault identifies, echoing his first lecture, two main avenues of 
inquiry, the first having to do with the establishment of a biohistory that 
would determine the effects at the biological level of the intervention of 
various medical institutions, the second having to do with an analysis of the 
18th century medicalization of the social body, whereby human existence, 
behaviors, and bodies came to be integrated into an increasingly tight 
“network [réseau] of medicalization.”53  The purpose of Foucault’s genealogy 
is therefore to study the development of medical institutions, particularly 
with respect to their effects on the lives of individuals and groups and in the 
context of their role in the medical investment of the population on the part 
of what he would later call biopower. 
 Starting from the question of whether the form of medicine that 
appeared during the 18th century was an individual or collective form of 
medicine, Foucault, in accordance with what he had already proposed in 
Birth of the Clinic, asserts from the very beginning that “modern medicine is 
a social medicine whose foundation is a certain technology of the social 
body.”54  That is not to say, of course, that the individual had no place in the 
novel form of medical practice that began to appear during the 18th century, 
for as Foucault himself notes, society’s control over its members is effected 
in part “in the body and with the body.”  Accordingly, the individual body 
became during this time a “biopolitical reality,” even as medicine took on 
the form of a “biopolitical strategy.”55  Nevertheless, the form of medical 
practice that emerged during this time, even as it sometimes intervened 
upon the individual body, took the form first and foremost of a collective 
medicine, one whose development occurred in three moments. 
 The first moment in the emergence of a social medicine—and the one 
which Foucault had already discussed in Birth of the Clinic—saw the 
elaboration, during the classical epoch, of a state medicine, reflecting an 
increasing biopolitical concern with the promotion and management of the 
health of the collective.  Thus, this epoch witnessed the birth of a form of 
medical practice dedicated to the “improvement of public health,” a medical 
practice that was by necessity accompanied by a centralized “state medical 
police” that itself operated along four main axes: 1) a system of thorough 
and widespread observation and recording of phenomena tied to collective 
morbidity, such as epidemics and endemic illnesses; 2) the “normalization” 
not only of health practices and behaviors, but of medical practice and 
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knowledge; 3) the creation throughout Europe of central administrative 
authorities, such as various professional medical societies, tasked with 
overseeing the activities of medical practitioners; and 4) the subsequent 
subordination of the practice of medicine, including the professional 
societies, to a generalized, centralized political authority.56 
 Taken together, these four developments in the practice of medicine 
during the 18th century marked the advent of a novel medical practice 
concerned not just with the health of the individual patient, but with that of 
the social body as a whole, insofar as the health of the population was 
inextricably tied to the survival of the state. And in laying the foundation for 
the medical investment of society, this new practice of social medicine 
played an invaluable role in ensuring the junction between biopower’s 
interventions at the level of the individual and those at the level of the 
collective. 
 Indeed, the novel social medicine put in place not only the conditions 
necessary for the control of aleatory events such as epidemics and endemic 
illnesses, but also those conditions necessary for the transformation of the 
individual into a medical subject whose behavior with respect to health and 
hygiene had a direct effect on the health of the population as a whole, and 
therefore on the survival of the state, and as a consequence had to be 
observed, regulated, and ultimately normalized.  In this sense, the setup of 
medicalization that emerged during the classical epoch represents one of the 
privileged avenues through which the nascent technologies of biopower 
established and exerted their control over the individual, over the 
population, and ultimately over the field of life itself, with its attendant 
phenomena of variation and chance.  This was achieved not only through 
the creation of a social medicine of the collective, but through a direct 
intervention upon the population’s material conditions of existence. 
 Thus, as Foucault describes in “The Birth of Social Medicine,” the 
second moment in the development of social medicine took the form of a 
thorough reorganization of the urban space, a process intended to eliminate 
those conditions of existence most conducive to the eruption of events of 
mass illness.  For various reasons, the city—its structure, its spatial 
organization, its inhabitants—posed during the 17th and 18th centuries an 
increasing health problem.  As Foucault points out, major cities between 
1750 and 1780, prior to the great reorganization of the urban space, 
represented a “confused multitude of heterogeneous territories and of rival 
powers.”57  Now, this dispersion of authority and of territories precluded 
any centralized power from exerting any sort of control over the city as a 
whole, with the consequence, in the context of the problem of the health of 
the population, that there existed no single set of laws and regulations 
administering the city’s public health and medical practices. As a result, and 
in order to facilitate as much as possible the medicalization of the social 
space for which the newfound concern for the well-being of the population 
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called, the problem of the unification and centralization of power over the 
city, as an environment inhabited by a population, had to be posed.  
Consequently, there appeared around the end of the 18th century a need to 
“unify the city, to organize the urban body in a coherent and homogeneous 
manner,” and thereby to administer the city through a single, unified 
authority; as one of the privileged avenues of control and investment of the 
population, the medicalization of society, and especially that of the city, 
required that the space in question be intervened upon and the power over 
it centralized and unified, so as to ensure the efficient administration of the 
life of the city and of its inhabitants.58 
 Central to the problem posed by the urban space around this time was 
the problem of the “urban population” and the “political-sanitary” danger it 
posed to the well-being of the social body.  As a locus of social unrest, the 
city represented a threat to the stability of the state.  But as a locus of 
infection, of contagion, and of epidemic, and as a result of the desultory 
health practices of its inhabitants and its filthy material conditions, the city 
represented an even greater danger, namely, that danger posed to the very 
health of its population.  In order, then, to “dominate these medical and 
political phenomena,” certain measures had to be put in place.  Accordingly, 
the medicalization of the urban population and of its environment took as its 
model a practice and mechanism of intervention particularly well suited to 
the need for the establishment of constant surveillance and control over the 
city and its inhabitants, namely, the model of the quarantine.59 
 Developed in response to phenomena of mass illness, and particularly 
to outbreaks of the plague, the disciplinary model of the quarantine, taken as 
a model for the medical investment and administration of the population 
and its environment, provided several distinct advantages and called for 
practices that would eventually underlie the medicalization of the social 
body as a whole, such as, for instance, the confinement of families to their 
homes, the partitioning of the city into areas falling under the authority of a 
designated inspector who would observe, record, and report his findings to 
a higher authority, the inspection of homes and their subsequent 
disinfection, and so on.60  Though extreme, these practices nonetheless 
represented the “political-medical ideal” for the proper and efficient spatial 
and “sanitary organization” of the city and for the medical management of 
its population. 
 Indeed, where models of intervention developed in response to 
illnesses like leprosy had focused on the expulsion and exclusion of the 
afflicted from the population, the quarantine model relied on a medical and 
political power that sought 
to position individuals in relation to one another [répartir 
les individus les uns à côté des autres], to isolate them, to 
individuate them, to monitor [surveiller] them one by one, 
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to control their state of health, to verify whether they were 
still alive or whether they were dead and in this way to 
maintain society in a space that was compartmentalized, 
constantly under surveillance, and controlled by a register, 
as complete as possible, of all of the events that had 
occurred [évènements survenus].61 
As Foucault later explained in Security, Territory, Population, these techniques 
would come to be supplemented by an edifice of security that would be 
even better equipped to address problems of mass such as that of the 
epidemic.  Nevertheless, understood in this manner, the quarantine 
provided a model for a medical intervention that had as its primary end the 
control and management of an entire population and the administration of 
its environment, which in turn allowed for the management of those 
aleatory events that most threatened the health of the population. 
 In its reorganization and regulation of the urban population’s medical 
and hygienic practices, for instance through the increasing importance of the 
concept of salubriousness, its constant surveillance and control over the 
urban space, and its reorganization of the very arrangement of that space (in 
the form, for instance, of the relocation of mass cemeteries and 
slaughterhouses to the exterior of the city, or the reorganization of the city’s 
streets in order to facilitate the circulation of the miasma believed to be 
responsible for outbreaks), urban social medicine established itself not only 
as a medicine of the individual person, body, or organism, but as a collective 
“medicine of the conditions of life of the environment of existence.”62  And 
with the importance taken on by the problem of salubriousness and public 
health, the various authorities concerned with public hygiene and the 
population’s medical practices—and, ultimately, the mechanisms of 
biopower—succeeded in establishing and subsequently exerting their 
control over that environment and its inhabitants, along with their attendant 
aleatory phenomena, in the name of their well-being, thereby facilitating and 
maintaining the perpetuation of the emerging mode of power. 
Conclusion  
In discussing biopower, to treat the setup of medicalization as distinct 
from those of sexuality and race is to run the risk of obscuring the fact that, 
for Foucault, each is inextricably connected to the others.  Nevertheless, I 
have chosen here to focus on medicalization because, as I have already 
noted, it is the one concern that runs through the quasi-entirety of Foucault’s 
œuvre.  During the late 1970’s, in texts like The Will to Knowledge and lecture 
courses like “Society Must Be Defended” and Security, Territory, Population, 
Foucault came to supplement his genealogy of modern disciplinary 
mechanisms with an account of a regime of power that ultimately took life, 
whether in the form of the individual body or that of the population and its 
various phenomena, as its domain of intervention.  In this emergence of a 
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regime of power exercised upon life at the level not just of the individual but 
also of the population, the medicalization of the individual, of the 
population, and of the social space represents the most significant 
biopolitical event.  But an examination of his work on medicine reveals that 
as early as 1963, in Birth of the Clinic, Foucault was already concerned with 
some of the mechanisms and problems he would later place at the center of 
his work on biopower and biopolitics, specifically, the emergence during the 
classical epoch of a social medicine tasked with ensuring the biological well-
being of entire populations through regulatory interventions upon their 
individual behaviors and their material conditions of existence, as well as 
the centralization and normalization of medical practice.  Moreover, this 
examination of Foucault’s work on medicine, and specifically of the 1974 
Brazilian lectures, reveals that even before he had arrived at a conception of 
biopower, concepts like those of biohistory and biopolitics had already 
begun to play central roles in his understanding of power. 
 In a 1973 interview, Foucault proposed that “today, the world is 
evolving toward a hospital model, and the government has taken on a 
therapeutic function.  The function of those in charge [namely, doctors, 
psychologists, psychiatrists, criminologists] is to adapt individuals to the 
process of development, in accordance with a veritable social orthopedics.”63  
A year later, he would echo this sentiment, proposing, as we have already 
seen, that medicine today has no field that is external to it: we inhabit, 
according to Foucault, open medical States in which every behavior, every 
space, every vital process is susceptible to medicalization, pathologization, 
regulation, administration, and normalization.  As Guillaume le Blanc notes, 
“the government of life finds, in the exercise of biopower, its true birth.”64  
Now, if we want to understand Foucault’s genealogy of biopower, we must 
be sure to understand the setup of medicalization, insofar as it represents a 
privileged means through which the junction between the 
technology/politics of the individual body and the technology/politics of 
the population was assured.  And as I have tried to show here, 
understanding the setup of medicalization requires that we look not only to 
Foucault’s later writings on biopower proper, but also to the work on 
medicine that occupies such a significant place in his project, for it is in that 
work that the seeds of Foucault’s genealogy of biohistory, biopolitics, and, 
ultimately, biopower can be found. 
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